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On August 3, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final
rule, known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP), to curb greenhouse gas emissions
from coal-fired power plants.2
Acting pursuant to its authority to regulate “any air
pollutant” under the Clean Air Act, the CPP calls for a
32 percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from
coal-fired power plants (compared to baseline 2005
levels) by 2030.3 Part of the Obama Administration’s
comprehensive Climate Action Plan, the CPP further
propels the country towards meeting the EPA’s goal of
reducing economy-wide emissions to 17 percent below
2005 levels by 2020 and 26-28 percent by 2025.4 The
electricity/power-generation sector is the nation’s largest
contributor to greenhouse gas emissions—responsible
for approximately one third of all carbon dioxide emissions, followed by the transportation sector, industrial
sources, and other commercial and residential sources
(see Figure 1).5
These emissions reduction targets set by the U.S.
government reflect the Administration’s deep concern
about climate change and its negative environmental,
social, and economic effects.6 The CPP affords flexibility to the states in how to meet these targets, including
through the use of efficiency improvements, switching to natural gas generation, and increasing the use of
renewables to generate power. The CPP also provides
flexibility to states to use different policy approaches

SUMMARY
• This Brief focuses on ways in which private firms are adopting
tools that mirror public law instruments—such as internal carbon
fees (similar to a public carbon tax) and private cap-and-trade
schemes (like public emissions trading schemes)—to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and address climate change.
• These private case studies suggest that significant progress
in reducing emissions can come from embedding emissions
reduction programs into core business strategy. Public regulators
therefore should consider the importance of making regulations an integral part of business strategy, rather than solely
an environmental “compliance” issue.
• Moreover, these case studies indicate that climate change,
as a global issue, requires public regulators to recognize the
potential contributions of global multinational firms. The EPA’s
Clean Power Plan allows for flexibility in the policy approaches
and levers that states use to reach their emissions reduction
targets. Private environmental governance solutions could be
encouraged to complement efforts like the CPP.
• Combating climate change will require multiple approaches.
Public and private actors should each pay greater attention to
and learn from each other’s practices and experiences.
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to achieve these goals, including the
adoption of cap-and-trade programs
or joining existing regional cap-andtrade schemes.
Yet even this ambitious rule—perhaps the most significant regulation
to date in the United States aimed
at curbing greenhouse gas emissions—cannot solve the global climate
change problem on its own. International governments, states, regions,
local governments, and private actors,
including multinational firms, must
also play a role. This Issue Brief will
focus specifically on the ways in which
private firms are adopting tools that
mirror public law instruments and
incorporating them into core business
practices. It will focus in particular on
the ways in which private actors have
adopted internal carbon fees (similar
to a public carbon tax) and private
cap-and-trade schemes (like public
emissions trading schemes) to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Such
private environmental governance has
a role to play in addressing climate
change. Public and private actors
should each therefore pay more attention to what the other is doing, and
also consider new ways to link systems
and create hybrid governance models.7

FIGURE 1: U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN 2013
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Source: All emission estimates from the Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2013.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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laws, and the regulations that followed,
utilized different public policy instruments to achieve environmental goals,
including prescriptive rules, property
rights, market-leveraging solutions like
taxes and subsidies, tradable permits,
informational governance, procurement and insurance, among other
approaches.8 But Congress has not
enacted any major new (or amended
any major existing) pollution control statutes since the 1990s. Other
government actors—states, municipalities, and regional compacts—have
stepped in to fill the void. And another

When one thinks of environmental
regulation, one often assumes that the
government—federal or state—is the
regulator, with private firms as the primary regulatory targets. In the heyday
of environmental legislation beginning
in the 1970s, the federal government
not only created the EPA, but adopted
significant national legislation on pollution control to protect the nation’s
air, water and land from the disposal or
improper releases of pollutants. These

NOTES
The primary source for this Issue Brief is Sarah E. Light,
The New Insider Trading: Environmental Markets within
the Firm, 34 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 1 (2015). We are grateful to
the editors of the Stanford Environmental Law Journal for
their permission to use this material. On the parallel ways
in which public and private actors employ tools to address
environmental harms, see also Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts,
Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5
Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. (forthcoming 2015).
2 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
1

Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, (Aug. 3, 2015) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). The final rule has not yet
been published in the Federal Register. The text of the rule
is available at http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/cleanpower-plan-existing-power-plants.
3 Carbon dioxide accounts for 82% of all greenhouse gas pollution in the U.S. See http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/
ghgemissions/gases.html.
4 The administration’s Climate Action Plan is available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/

2

president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.
EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/
sources/electricity.html.
6 The ten warmest years on record have all occurred since
1998. (Source: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/201413).
7 Light, supra note 1; Light & Orts, supra note 1.
8 Light & Orts, supra note 1.
9 For a general explanation of this theory, see Light & Orts,
supra note 1.
5
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set of actors—private firms and nongovernmental organizations—have
likewise begun to adopt environmental
standard-setting, either as part of their
own environmental governance, or to
set and enforce broader standards as
third-party enforcement agents.
Private firms may view environmental standard-setting as an opportunity to earn goodwill and additional
profit, or perhaps they are preparing
for increased government regulation in
the near future. Regardless of motivation, private firms, including large
multinational corporations, are making
strategic business choices to address
environmental harms such as climate
change. One way in which private
firms are acting is by adopting practices and private “instruments” that
mirror public regulatory approaches,
despite the private actors’ very different
end goals and scope of governance.9
Such private environmental governance solutions can have a significant,
possibly global, impact in fighting
climate change because of the multinational nature of the firms involved,
as well as the magnitude of the greenhouse gas emissions they can affect. A
non-governmental organization, the
CDP (formerly known as the Carbon
Disclosure Project), provides both a
reporting platform for firms to disclose

their greenhouse gas emissions annually, and data analysis of that reporting.
Recent analysis revealed that the top
fifty out of more than four hundred
private firms reporting to the CDP in
2013 accounted for roughly 75 percent
of all reported emissions.10 Consider a
multinational firm like British Petroleum (BP), a firm that I analyze below
for its adoption of a private carbon
emissions trading platform in the early
2000s. In 2013, BP reported a carbon
footprint larger than the reported 2012
emissions within each of sixteen U.S.
states.11 Thus, private environmental
governance can play a significant role
in addressing greenhouse gas emissions
globally in the absence of a single,
international regime requiring emissions reductions. A closer inspection
of private environmental governance
seems warranted in light of this fact,
so I now turn to two examples of firms
taking different approaches to reducing their carbon footprints that mirror
mechanisms used and advocated by
public regulators.

BP AND THE NEW “INSIDER
TRADING”
Tradable permit systems, also called
“cap-and-trade” schemes or emissions
trading in the climate context, are

often proposed as an efficient public
policy solution to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. Under a tradable
permit system, emissions are “capped”
within a jurisdiction through the
creation of a finite number of emissions allowances. Often the number
of allowances decreases over time
to encourage continuing reductions.
Firms can trade allowances based
upon their calculus of whether it is
cheaper to reduce emissions or purchase an allowance on the market.
Such a system minimizes the overall
cost of abatement by guaranteeing that
emissions reductions will proceed from
cheapest-to-reduce sources first to
most-expensive-to-reduce sources last.
On the flip side of these efficiency and
cost benefits, existing cap-and-trade
systems have mixed records, with some
instances of the oversupply of emissions allowances, the grandfathering
of high, existing pollution levels which
undercut the programs’ goals, and the
high administrative costs of creating, running, and policing the system.
The United States, for example, has
successfully used emissions trading to
reduce sulfur dioxide (a component
of acid rain) under the Clean Air Act.
Sub-national bodies, including the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(a consortium of nine states) and the

NOTES
CDP GLOBAL 500 CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT 2013.
The sixteen states are: AK, CT, DE, HI, ID, ME, MT, NE, NV,
NH, NM, ND, OR, RI, SD, and VT, as well as DC. BP SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2013 (2013); EPA, CO2 Emissions from
Fossil Fuel Combustion (2014).
12 David G. Victor & Johsua C. House, BP’s Emissions Trading
System, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 2100, 2101 (2006).
13 The specific focus here on BP’s emissions trading should not
be read as an endorsement of BP’s environmental policies
or practices more broadly, which must be read in context,
10
11

including in the context of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill.
14 S. 2940 (113th Cong. 2015).
15 I note that other private institutions have adopted or announced their intention to adopt internal carbon pricing,
including the Disney Corporation and Yale University. See
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT, THE WALT DISNEY
COMPANY (2014); Yale University, Presidential Carbon Task
Force Report (2015). I distinguish the adoption of a carbon
fee from the use by a firm of a “shadow” carbon price in
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the context of investment decisions, where no fee is actually “collected” from business units. More than 150 firms
worldwide have begun to incorporate shadow carbon pricing
into their investment decisions. CDP, GLOBAL CORPORATE
USE OF CARBON PRICING: DISCLOSURES TO INVESTORS
(2014).
16 TAMARA “TJ” DICAPRIO, MICROSOFT CORP., BECOMING
CARBON NEUTRAL: HOW MICROSOFT IS STRIVING TO
BECOME LEANER, GREENER, AND MORE ACCOUNTABLE
(2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/n26rxcx; TAMARA
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eight years ahead of schedule.
The design of this internal trading
system came with challenges similar
to those faced by public regulators
when crafting a public emissions trading platform. BP’s managers had to
determine an appropriate cap, establish
an administrative infrastructure (i.e.,
collection, reporting, and data management), and allocate initial emissions allowances at the outset—all of
which are politically and operationally complex tasks. To administer the
program on an ongoing basis, the firm
centralized some operations. It created
a Climate Steering Group responsible
for all climate policy and employed
experienced oil and gas traders to
construct the actual trading platform.
But the firm left the actual “insider
trading” to its various business units,
each of which could determine on its
own whether to designate traders with
a commercial background, as opposed
to a background in the environment,
health, or safety. It also authorized
managers in the different business
units to enforce compliance, and this
became part of each manager’s performance contract.12 Business units did
not exchange money when permits
were traded, so as to avoid unwanted
tax consequences. Likewise, the firm
did not want this effort to affect how

state of California have implemented
tradable permit regimes specifically
to address greenhouse gas emissions.
The new CPP expressly permits states
to adopt tradable permit systems or to
join existing regional systems to meet
their emissions reduction goals.
Before the establishment of the
European Union’s Emissions Trading
System (EU ETS), and UK public
laws regulating emissions, BP adopted
an internal, private emissions trading program within the firm. In 1999,
BP launched the system as a “pilot”
initiative, and in 2000, the firm implemented the policy firm-wide. Its goal,
as stated publicly by the CEO, was
to reduce emissions by 10% (relative
to a 1990 baseline) by 2010. Several
motivations prompted the adoption
of this internal trading scheme. Firm
managers wanted to develop expertise in emissions allowance trading
prior to the implementation of any
public regulation; to gain credibility
when they lobbied on behalf of emissions trading as the best public policy
alternative; to craft a solution for its
decentralized and diverse business
units; and to drum up goodwill and
reputational benefits as a result of its
efforts. By 2002, BP terminated the
program, having already exceeded its
10 percent reduction target—nearly

its managers deployed capital, so BP
created a special fund for emissionsreduction investments that might not
otherwise meet BP’s return on investment criteria.
Originally inspired by public
cap-and-trade systems, BP’s emissions
trading platform now has lessons for
public regulators, as well as other private actors. The commitments created
by the CEO’s public statements (the
10 percent reduction plan) provided
accountability. Partnering with the
Environmental Defense Fund, a
respected non-governmental organization, to craft the emissions trading
system provided additional credibility.
On the flip side, managers tolerated
non-compliance when the price of
emissions allowances rose more than
expected, and the firm ended the
program when it could have continued
to reduce emissions further. Despite
the imperfect design and other limitations of this “insider trading” (e.g.,
speculative trading, price spikes, and
toleration of non-compliance), BP’s
platform for emissions trading allowed
it to reduce emissions significantly.13

MICROSOFT’S INTERNAL
CARBON FEE
Another approach to addressing

NOTES
“TJ” DICAPRIO, MICROSOFT CORP., THE CARBON FEE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013), available at http://tinyurl.
com/lotams6.
17 The CDP estimates that Microsoft’s carbon fee is in the $6
to $7 per ton range, notably less than the roughly $10-$80
per ton “fees” utilized by the more than 150 global firms that
use shadow carbon pricing systems to make investment
decisions. (Source: CDP) The company’s Chief Environmental Strategist, Robert Bernard, has explained that Microsoft
sets the fee by examining the price for carbon offsets on a

quarterly basis.
A good example of greenwashing is Volkswagon’s recent
touting of its diesel engines as “clean diesel,” notwithstanding its use of defeat devices to cheat on emissions tests for
nitrogen oxides.
19 New Jersey’s decision to withdraw from the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative in 2011 is an example of a public
parallel. (Source: REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE,
www.rggi.org).
20 EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/prog18
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ress-cleaning-air-and-improving-peoples-health.
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climate change is the use of carbon
taxes, which put a price on the negative externalities caused by pollution,
and thus force firms to internalize
these costs. The United States has
never adopted a carbon tax. Previous efforts, for example, to propose
a “BTU tax” under President Clinton, demonstrated significant issues
of political feasibility, although two
Senators recently introduced a new
carbon tax bill called the American
Opportunity Carbon Fee Act.14 In
addition to these political feasibility
challenges, carbon taxes have design,
implementation, and durability challenges, though many economists
would agree that these issues are less
complex than those posed by emissions trading. Interestingly, despite
the political feasibility limitations in
the public sphere, a number of private
actors have recently adopted private
carbon fees to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.15
In the summer of 2012, Microsoft announced its goal to become
carbon neutral in its data centers,
software development labs, offices,
and employee business air travel.16
The company decided that the best
way to provide incentives for emissions reductions within its business
units was by using a carbon fee, but
only if the mechanics were simple and
did not distract employees from their
primary value creation activities. The
added benefit was that implementing a carbon fee could raise funds for
other emissions-reduction activities.
The issues with designing this private, internal carbon fee mirror those
of establishing a public carbon tax.
Microsoft had to set the correct “price”
for each marginal unit of emissions,

determine the scope of emissions
covered by the fee, and administer
the system, which included creating
processes for collection, management,
and enforcement of compliance.17 The
fee is collected through the company’s
existing “chargeback” system, mirroring how government regulators
could rely on an existing tax system to
collect a carbon tax. Using an existing
system reduces administrative costs.
The administration is handled by a
partnership between the company’s
Environmental Sustainability team
and its Corporate Finance department. And this is a crucial point: by
not isolating the carbon fee program
as a “sustainability” measure, but
rather classifying it as a strategic
financing and accounting measure,
Microsoft has embedded the carbon
fee into its core business practices.
This could have a public parallel, as I
discuss in the Policy Recommendations section below.
Unlike BP’s emissions trading
program, Microsoft’s carbon fee did
not allow for the grandfathering of
existing emissions levels. The business
units responsible for carbon emissions
feel the financial impact of the fee in
direct proportion to their emitting
activities, as an incentive for innovative reduction strategies. But similar
to BP, Microsoft is a global firm
and operates in over 100 countries.
Though its carbon fee does not apply
to all of its divisions, the transnational
scope of this internal policy is significant. By the end of the program’s first
year ( June 2013), Microsoft had met
its goal of becoming carbon neutral
in its selected business units. The
majority of reductions resulted from
purchases of renewable energy.
5

As with the BP case, there are
some interesting lessons here. Reputational (and environmental) benefits aside, Microsoft has figured out
that its use and promotion (to other
firms) of a carbon fee program has
the potential to create new business
opportunities for the firm. Many
of Microsoft’s suggestions for how
other firms could administer a carbon
fee would create new customers for
Microsoft’s core business of software
and technology. This bodes well for
the durability of its use of the fee.
For example, if another private firm
seeks to purchase Renewable Energy
Certificates or carbon credits to offset
emissions, Microsoft now hosts a
platform for such transactions on its
cloud. This is a clear example of how
thinking about the long-term benefits
of carbon-emissions reductions may
be worthwhile from a business standpoint. Furthermore, the continued use
of the carbon fee by Microsoft sends
the expressive message that private
firms have a responsibility to combat
climate change, even (and perhaps
especially) in the absence of public
prescriptive rules.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:
A MULTI-FACETED BATTLE
AGAINST GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE
The adoption of public law concepts
by private firms shows that public
environmental governance has had
a significant influence over private
environmental governance decisions.
As the tables are turned, there are two
takeaways from the private application
of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade
systems that policymakers and regula-
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tors should consider in their ongoing
attempts to combat climate change.
But first, the caveats.
There are many forms of private
environmental governance, and each
requires evaluation along a number
of key dimensions. For example, all
private environmental governance
approaches are susceptible to “greenwashing,” which occurs when
an entity makes misleading public
statements or otherwise creates a
falsely positive impression about its
environmental performance.18 In
addition, there is a concern that since
private managers are often motivated
by short-term profits, private governance solutions can be terminated
on a whim (though there are public
parallels here, too).19 Such limitations
of private environmental governance
must be considered alongside the following recommendations.
The first implication from these
private case studies is that significant progress in reducing emissions
can come from embedding programs
like emissions trading platforms and
carbon fees into core business strategy.
Employing fees and trading—core
functions of many businesses—can
help to avoid the “siloing” of carbon
reduction programs as health, safety,
and environmental issues. Based on
Microsoft’s example, public regulators should consider the importance
of making regulations feel like a core
part of business strategy, rather than
a “compliance” issue. Here, the public
lesson may be to create a partnership

and shared jurisdiction between the
EPA and another agency that already
has authority and credibility with
the financial side of private firms (for
example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Internal Revenue
Service), when it comes to the administration of public law environmental
regulations, thereby broadening the
goal of emissions reduction from an
issue solely of environmental
concern to one of business and financial concern.
The second lesson here is for
business leaders. While “tax” may be a
four-letter word in the United States
as a matter of policymaking, the fact
that more than 150 firms globally
have adopted shadow carbon pricing
to make investment decisions, and
several leading firms and now Universities have adopted carbon fees, suggests that private carbon pricing may
be a strategy that is gaining credence
in the fight against climate change in
the private sphere.
The second implication reiterates a common thread from this brief,
specifically that climate change, as a
global issue, requires public regulators to recognize the potential contributions of global multinational
firms. The Clean Power Plan’s flexibility, including its recognition that
increased energy efficiency in electric
power generation is a building block
to meet its goals, suggests that private
environmental governance solutions
could help firms reduce emissions.
Policymakers, regardless of what

6

happens with the rollout of the CPP,
should be hesitant to employ technology-based prescriptive standards
to achieve emissions reductions in the
future because this type of regulation discourages the use of innovative
private governance solutions.

CONCLUSION
Since 1970, air pollution in the U.S.
has decreased by roughly 70 percent
while gross domestic product has
grown by more than 200 percent.20
The Clean Power Plan, and the Climate Action Plan in general, take positive steps in the ongoing fight against
anthropogenic climate change, but
they are not the whole story. Private
firms already are making proactive
decisions to internalize the negative
externalities of pollution, as is evident
from the cases of BP, Microsoft, and
many other firms. The new “insider
trading,” the use of carbon fees, and
the expressive messages generated by
private actors in the absence of global
regulation can complement existing
public environmental governance.
Despite the limitations of private
environmental governance, the sheer
global reach of private firms, as well
as their ability both to learn from and
teach public regulators about effective emissions reduction solutions,
equips them with the capacity to
make a significant, positive impact on
the environment. Combating climate
change will require multiple actors—
and more than one approach.
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